This view is strongly contested by others, who feel that it is naive or anthropomorphic, and romanticizes animals beyond what is known about them, to credit them with an inner world that merits such treatment. Such people tend to see animals as being more appropriately protected by strong and broad animal cruelty and similar laws.
At the heart of this debate lie complex issues and questions that are still being explored by ethologists, philosophers, lawyers and specialists in many related fields: What does it mean to be a human or animal? Are we different or better than them? What rights do we have to use what we find on earth? What degree of animal pain is justified to attain a measure of potential human benefit? How do we balance custodianship and utility? And, do animals feel or think in a way that makes giving them rights meaningful, or are they simply instinctive beings with minimal self-awareness beyond the "now", which are useful and benefit human beings?
Although not usually discussed under the name "speciesism", a term which can sound extremist or fringe, the underlying issues are mainstream ones and actively debated in many ways at present.
Some people who use the term feel that all animals should have the same rights, or, that all animals and people should have the same rights (similar to Human rights legislation). Others feel that rights might vary according to species none the less, thus a chimpanzee might be given a higher level of rights, than (for example) a rat or an ant. Others see some core rights due to all animals, with additional rights for those species to which they might apply. The commonality between all these views is they all reject the "human v. other" dichotomy which is embedded in current law, as inappropriate and disrespectful of animals' status as living sentient beings.
As well, humans gain great advantage from animals and from their ability to use them in a utilitarian manner, and they lack an ability to communicate in spoken words or process conceptual thought to the extent people can, leading people to see them as lower.
Historically, most religions define animals as lower forms of life, on earth merely to serve and be used for humans' benefit, by divine law.
Philosophers Tom Regan and Peter Singer have both criticized speciesism. Regan rejects it because it permits unjustified violations of animals' inherent rights; Singer, because it violates the principle of Equal consideration of interests.
On the other hand, whilst many feel animals should have some rights - perhaps if only the rights they are given now - the idea of giving them fundamentally new sets of rights is controversial. Behind this objection lies a sense in the minds of most people, that animals are not people, and that they should not and cannot be treated as equals in this way - precisely the heart of arguments put forward by proponents. It is also seen by some as a grey area and one which owould be hard to know how to enforce. There is no research suggesting that those who fight against discrimination in other ways - sexism or racism for example - are any different in this area to others in society when it comes to animals and their place in society. In this sense, parochialism is probably grounded in human beings no less than in any other species, and the instinct amongst people is to protect what is closest first. Comparison between that, and sexism and racism, for example, is often viewed as insulting, and critics observe that virtually all non-human animals treat members of their own species better than those of other species and that such behaviour shoudl therefore be no less acceptable in human beings.
A counter point to this, is that most sets of rights have evolved gradually and society adapted over time. Things are unacceptable now that would have been accepted a century ago. So our view as humans and society towards other animals and their rights can change too.
One notable exception is Rhode Island, which in 2001 became the first state to pass a law recasting "animal owners" as "animal guardians" in animal legislation. Although described by some as a mere "feel good" exercise, others believe that viewing animals legally as living, feeling beings instead of property has been a "huge step in promoting human compassion" with "potentially enormous legal implications". A similar move has been undertaken in many other towns and states.
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A step further, David Favre, a law professor at Michigan State University, has proposed establishing a new legal tort, which he calls intentional interference with the primary interests of an individual chimpanzee. It is likely that chimpanzees in particular were chosen for several reasons: they are the species closest to humans biologically, able to communicate significantly in American Sign Language, highly studied and hence with the highest likelihood of recognition of selfhood and legal rights.
This new tort would require the interests of a chimpanzee to be balanced with the specific interests that a university, researcher, zoo, etc. has in that particular animal, and was presented at a talk at Harvard sponsored by the Chimpanzee Collaboratory’s Legal Committee in 2002.
"Personhood" for certain animals is a more nebulous concept, but has also had its legal discussion, here. Again for the same reasons, the primary species considered are Great Apes.